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Title: Autonomy versus futility? Barriers to good clinical practice in end-of-life care: 
a Queensland case. 
 
Findings from a Queensland Coroner’s case highlight the complex clinical, ethical 
and legal issues that arise when clinicians and family members disagree about a 
diagnosis of clinical futility.  We identify the need to improve communication 
between doctors and families, as well as community and professional education to 
resolve tensions that can arise in these kinds of cases. 
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The Queensland Inquest into the death of June Woo1 has highlighted the tensions 
between good clinical practice, the role of patient autonomy and substitute decision-
making, and the legitimate constraints placed on the provision of futile treatment.  In 
this discussion, we summarise the case and its legal implications and argue that 
improved communication between clinicians and families, as well as education of the 
community about the dying process are needed to attain an acceptable outcome when 
clinicians and families initially disagree about treatment.   
 
Queensland Law and the Coroner's Findings 
The 2007 coronial inquest into the death of June Woo 1 provided the following case 
summary: 
 
“In the early evening of 14 November 2002, Mrs June Woo, an 82 year old 
woman with a history of pulmonary fibrosis and chronic respiratory failure, was 
admitted to the Princess Alexandra Hospital in Brisbane. She was assessed in the 
Emergency Department. Initially, she was minimally responsive. However, after 
an hour or so she become combative and was confused and distressed. She was 
sedated. At about midnight she was moved to a respiratory ward. At about 
9.10pm the following night Mrs Woo stopped breathing. As a “not for 
resuscitation” order had been made the evening before, resuscitation was not 
attempted. One of the attending doctors later issued a cause of death certificate 
listing hyperkalaemia (higher than normal levels of potassium in the blood) as the 
principle (sic) cause of death. The family did not accept this and so, after some 
delay, the death was referred to the Brisbane Coroner for investigation”. 
 
Findings about medical care: The NFR order 
The Coroner found that Mrs Woo’s medical care was appropriate and that further 
interventions would have been unlikely to extend the patient’s life. The areas of 
concern identified by the Coroner related to the process surrounding the making of the 
NFR order, including the extent and nature of the family’s involvement in this 
decision.  In Queensland, consent to health care for adults who lack decision-making 
capacity is governed by the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) 
(‘GAA’) and the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) (together, Queensland’s 
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‘guardianship legislation’).     The guardianship legislation requires consent to carry 
out ‘health care’. Significantly and somewhat paradoxically, ‘health care’ is defined 
in the GAA (schedule 2, section 5) to include ‘withholding or withdrawal of a life-
sustaining measure ... if the commencement or continuation of the measure ... would 
be inconsistent with good medical practice’. ‘Good medical practice’ is defined 
(schedule 2, section 5B, GAA) by reference to recognised medical and ethical 
standards of the medical profession in Australia.  This means that consent is needed to 
withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure, even if providing that treatment 
would be inconsistent with good medical practice.  If the patient does not have an 
advance health directive, consent to health care must generally be obtained from a 
substitute decision-maker on behalf of the patient (section 66 GAA).  In this case, 
consent from one or both of the daughters was therefore required before a NFR order 
could be made. 
 
In light of the requirement for consent to withhold treatment, the Coroner examined 
how Mrs Woo’s daughters were involved in the NFR decision.  The evidence 
indicated that when the NFR order was made in the emergency department, the 
treating emergency physician ‘did not consider the decision was one the relatives 
could consent or object to’ as further intervention was medically futile.  The patient 
chart recorded: ‘family are aware of prognosis, has been visited by a priest’.  The 
Coroner found that what occurred in the emergency department did not constitute 
consent by the daughters, and indicated that had the patient arrested in the emergency 
department and the NFR been followed then ‘significant legal consequences may 
have followed’. Pursuant to the GAA (section 79), it is an offence to carry out health 
care (which includes the withholding of health care) without obtaining consent. The 
patient subsequently died in the respiratory ward, where cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation was withheld as per the NFR order.  The Coroner held that, by the time 
of the patient’s death, there had been sufficient discussions with the daughters about 
the NFR order to constitute ‘tacit consent’, making the NFR lawful. 
 
Recommendation about the hospital’s NFR policy 
The Coroner also reviewed the hospital’s NFR policy, and was critical that it did not 
require consent for a NFR order to be obtained from the appropriate decision-maker.  
He recommended the policy be reviewed to ensure compliance with the guardianship 
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legislation, suggesting that a form be developed to ensure relevant consents are 
obtained. As a response in part to the Coroner’s criticism of the hospital NFR policy, 
Queensland Health has developed and piloted a state-wide Acute Resuscitation Plan 
(ARP)  form3 which is to be completed ‘where it is reasonably expected that an adult 
patient (≥18) may suffer an acute deterioration or critical event (e.g. cardiac or 
respiratory arrest) in the foreseeable future and require resuscitation planning’. 
 
Implications for Clinical Practice  
The findings outlined create practical, professional and ethical challenges for medical 
staff who believe that resuscitation should not be provided in a particular case.  From 
a clinical perspective, applying interventions such as CPR is inappropriate if no 
benefit will be achieved. Where doctors have consensus regarding futility of end-of-
life care but disagree with family, it appears, perhaps as an unintended consequence, 
that the Act places clinicians in a difficult position of potentially having to choose 
between complying with the law and best medical practice. Legally compelling a 
doctor to seek consent not to commence a futile intervention may suggest that a 
choice exists when, in reality, death is inevitable. Murphy considers that seeking 
consent not to actively treat may create misunderstanding and place an unwarranted 
burden on a family in crisis, including making them feel complicit in ending the life 
of their relative.4 Others argue that grieving persons, including those experiencing 
anticipatory grief, may use denial as a method of coping5,6  which can significantly 
influence their ability to make decisions in the best interests of the dying patient.   
 
For clinical staff, the requirement to provide resuscitation they regard as futile places 
physical demands and personal burdens recognised as contributory factors leading to 
emotional exhaustion and burnout.7,8 In some circumstances, exhaustion and burnout 
can translate into poor staff retention, absenteeism, poor productivity and workplace 
conflict.9,10  
 
While the law rightly preserves patient autonomy, it also has the potential to 
exacerbate the conditions for undignified and prolonged deaths. The refusal by a 
substitute decision-maker to accept the inevitable death of a loved one may result in a 
dying patient receiving harmful invasive treatment.  
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But in this complex debate there are also other important values and ethical 
perspectives to consider. The lack of consensus at times within the medical profession 
(and advanced specialties) on diagnosing clinical futility is particularly salient.  
Assessments of futility should also include appraisal of the quality of life to be 
pursued and, as such, are not the sole remit of clinicians.  Conversations with family 
regarding the patient’s quality of life are necessary to decide whether treatment is 
futile for that individual. The current Queensland regime would promote, indeed 
require, that engagement.  While it should be noted that the Queensland legislation 
contains a mechanism to resolve intractable disagreement between clinicians and 
family members by requesting the Adult Guardian, a statutory officer, to consent to 
the withholding or refusal of treatment (section 43 GAA), clinical experience suggests 
there are real practical difficulties in obtaining such decisions regarding end-of-life 
care that may be required in the next few hours. 
 
Conclusion  
The Coronial decision in Queensland highlights challenges that exist under the current 
guardianship legislation: it conflicts with the common law that it replaced and is 
poorly understood by clinicians.11  In part because of this lack of familiarity, 
Queensland’s regulation may also have broader implications for practices and policies 
regarding which patients can access certain types of treatment, such as intensive care. 
Because reasonable people can have different views on whether treatment is futile in 
any given situation, good communication and community and professional education 
are critical to resolving the tensions that arise when clinicians and family initially 
disagree.  Families need to be supported in making difficult decisions to withhold or 
withdraw treatment, and health professionals need to understand the legal imperative 
to provide that support. 
 
Competing interests: Dr Sean Lawrence was the treating physician in this case. No 
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